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This thesis investigates how fiscal policy affects output (GDP) in a small, open economy.
The analysis utilizes data on Mainland GDP, government spending and taxes in Norway
from 1978 to 2017. In order to identify and estimate effects of exogenous fiscal shocks,
we employ the sign restrictions approach in a Structural Vector Autogregression (SVAR)
model. Our study represents a solid contribution to the literature of fiscal policy for two
main reasons. First, we aim to provide empirical evidence on the effects of fiscal policy
shocks in a small, open economy, for which the empirical literature is limited. Second, we
conduct such an analysis through employing the sign restrictions approach which has not
been widely applied thus far. Therefore, the study of Norway through such an approach
provides a novel contribution to the suitability of the sign restrictions approach for small,
open economies.
We find a positive effect on GDP from an increase in government spending, although
the spending multiplier on GDP is weak and insignificant in the short run. Following
a tax increase, GDP is negatively affected with a significant effect on impact. However,
this negative effect is rather short-lived and becomes positive when including private
consumption and investment in the model. Thus, we do not find a conclusive effect from
tax shocks through the sign restrictions approach. We argue that the inconclusive findings
in our analysis are likely due to a limited amount of identified fiscal shocks when employing
sign restrictions. This is further supported when utilizing a more conventional recursive
ordering approach for identification, through which we find a significantly positive effect on
GDP following spending shocks. However, neither the sign restrictions or the conventional
recursive approach provides conclusive evidence for tax shocks. Thus, we find that the
analysis of net tax levels is an inadequate measure for tax effects in Norway, as tax changes
in Norway predominantly focus on marginal tax rates and taxation structures.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Purpose
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate how fiscal policy affects total output (GDP) in
a small, open economy through changes to government spending and taxes. Primarily,
fiscal policy analysis studies the effects on GDP of fiscal shocks, which are changes to
government spending and taxes that are independent from monetary policy and business
cycle changes (Ramey, 2016). To this end, we apply a similar methodology and study the
effects of fiscal shocks in Norway, as an interesting example of a small, open economy.
Several studies of fiscal shocks build on Blanchard and Perotti (2002), which estimates
the dynamic effects of fiscal shocks on output in the United States through a Structural
Vector Autoregression (SVAR) model. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) finds that positive
government spending shocks have a positive effect on GDP, whereas positive tax shocks
negatively affect GDP. The same effects are found for private consumption. Conversely,
the study finds that both increases in spending and taxes have negative effects on private
investment. Mountford and Uhlig (2009) expands the study utilizing the sign resrictions
approach to identify fiscal shocks, which we follow in this thesis. Similar to Blanchard
and Perotti (2002), the study finds that increased spending and reduced taxes positively
affect GDP, estimating less significant effects on private consumption and investment.
Although the central theoretical frameworks on fiscal policy agree on the general effects on
output of fiscal shocks, they offer diverging predictions of the effects on consumption and
private investment. In addition, empirical findings are not entirely persuasive and offer
mixed support to theoretical predictions. Hence, there is little consensus on the effect of
fiscal shocks on the economy (Perotti et al., 2007). Traditionally, in contrast to monetary
policy research, limited emphasis has been put on the study of fiscal policy. During
the last decade, however, the amount of empirical analyses and academic discussions
on fiscal policy effects has increased substantially with a stronger need for active fiscal
policy (Thygesen et al., 2019). In consequence, there has been a gradual evolution in
empirical methodologies investigating such relationships in recent years. For instance, the
sign restrictions approach to identify fiscal shocks in a Structural Vector Autoregression
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(SVAR) model aims to limit heavy theoretical assumptions and facilitate an agnostic
approach to study fiscal policy (Mountford and Uhlig, 2009).
Following the Great Recession, many governments had to compensate for limited capacity
in monetary policy due to low interest rates nearing the zero lower bound and damaged
financial markets (IMF, 2017). In consequence, many economies had to rely on increased
government spending to counteract an immense recession and implemented large fiscal
stimuli, particularly in the form of financial sector guarantees and countercyclical policy
acts. These stimuli packages were employed while tax revenues fell dramatically due to
struggling private sectors, putting pressure on fiscal budgets that were already strained
prior to the crisis. Thus, large national budget deficits accumulated that were hard to
recover from, especially in countries experiencing a total collapse in commerce and the
trade balance (Varoufakis, 2016). With high levels of public debt, many governments
have had limited opportunity to conduct active fiscal policy, which has proved further
challenging amidst the COVID-19 pandemic (Arezki and Devarajan, 2020).
In contrast, Norway is able to derive much of its countercyclical economic actions through
fiscal policy due to the Government Pension Fund Global and its impact on national
budget deficits. The Fund and the ability to stimulate demand through government
spending has been essential for the bounce-back of Norwegian economic activity. This has
been evident through the Great Recession and the oil crisis of 2014, in addition to the
sharp economic downturn following the COVID-19 pandemic. As such, Norway serves
as a relevant study of active fiscal policy in a small, open economy. Moreover, similar
to other countries, Norway is facing a demographically demanding period, commonly
called the Age Wave, where national budgetary challenges will be highly relevant issues in
socioeconomic policy. Due to increased life expectancy, reduced child mortality and the
‘baby-boomer’ generation aging, Norway and other countries alike are facing a significant
fall in the active labour force relative to the total population. This will likely cause reduced
tax revenues per capita and increased negative taxes in the form of social transfers. In
addition, a study of employment in Norway since the millennial change suggests that
this development is further backed by automatization and limited flexibility in the labor
market (Bhuller and Eika, 2019). Accordingly, changes to spending and tax patterns are
reasonable to expect in the near future across several economies, including Norway. Hence,
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it is highly useful to investigate the effects of fiscal shocks in an economy such as Norway
and assess implications for fiscal policy-making.
Our study represents a solid contribution to the literature of fiscal policy for two main
reasons. First, we aim to provide empirical evidence on fiscal policy effects on a small,
open economy. Predominantly, empirical literature of fiscal shocks thus far has studied the
U.S. economy and other large economies such as Germany and the U.K. To this end, the
study of effects in Norway contributes to limited empirical literature concerning the effects
of government spending and tax shocks in small, open economies. To the best of our
knowledge, there are few studies of fiscal shocks in Norway. With the exception of some
master theses, only Asche and Kristjánsson (2019) investigates effects of Norwegian fiscal
policy through a SVAR framework. Asche and Kristjánsson (2019) finds that government
spending increases output, albeit with a smaller effect than in studies of other large
economies. However, the study struggles to capture the effect of tax shocks in a sufficient
manner. With this in mind, we apply a different approach to estimate the effects of
government spending and tax shocks in the Norwegian economy.
Thus, our second major contribution is the employment of the sign restrictions approach,
which has not been widely applied in fiscal policy. The approach aims to relieve the
analysis of theoretical assumptions and as such "let the data speak for itself". Partly
due to the computational complexity of applying the approach, most literature thus far
has concentrated on the same U.S. data. Therefore, the study of Norway through such
an approach provides an interesting contribution to the suitability of the sign restriction
approach for small, open economies.
1.2 Research Question
To investigate the effects of fiscal policy in a small, open economy, we propose the following
research question:
What are the dynamic effects of fiscal policy shocks on output in Norway?
We attempt to answer this question through a sign restrictions approach for identification
of fiscal shocks in a Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) model.
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1.3 Outline
The study is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present an overview of the Norwegian
fiscal framework, emphasizing the importance of the Government Pension Fund Global.
Section 3 presents a theoretical background concerning the effects of fiscal policy, while
Section 4 reviews empirical literature investigating these effects. Section 5 presents our
empirical strategy. Section 6 gives a description of the collection and treatment of our
data, while in Section 7 we present the findings of our analysis. Finally, our concluding
remarks are presented in Section 8.
5
2 Institutional Background
2.1 Characteristics of Norwegian Fiscal Policy
A definition commonly used by the Norwegian Ministry of Finance defines the role of fiscal
policy as the sum of decisions that affects government spending and revenue, excluding
sales and purchases of receivables (Johansen, 1965). Both volume and composition of
spending and revenue is predominantly determined within the Norwegian Parliament
through an annual national budget and a revised budget. In line with previous literature,
government spending refers to the sum of total government consumption plus investment
(Blanchard and Perotti, 2002). Government revenue or income is generally defined in
related literature as the sum of all taxes less transfers and interest payments, which are
regarded as negative taxes. For simplicity, we refer to government revenue as taxes or net
taxes throughout this study, following e.g. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Mountford
and Uhlig (2009).
Norwegian fiscal policy aims to finance a vast amount of common goods and welfare
systems, in addition to accumulate sovereign wealth, without enforcing a perceived unfair
tax burden on the population and without negatively affecting the remaining economy
(NOU2015:9, 2015). With a comprehensive public sector regarding both government
consumption and investment, Norway is a country in which fiscal policy has a substantial
presence in the economy, as illustrated in Figure 2.1. Furthermore, amidst large national
budget deficits across the world following the Great Recession, Norway is in a fortunate
position regarding fiscal room for maneuver compared to myriad countries. This is evident
in Figure 2.1, where Norway is second only to Luxembourg with respect to government
spending and revenue.
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Figure 2.1: General Government Revenues and Expenditures Per Capita in US dollars,
Current Prices and PPPs. The red and blue columns represent 2013 revenues and
expenditures in Norway, respectively. Retrieved from the OECD Factbook 2015-2016
(OECD, 2016).
The particularities of the Norwegian Fiscal Framework further act as a countercyclical
measure to offset business cycle fluctuations. As such, Norwegian fiscal policy has been
important to “lean against the wind” in booms and stimulate activity in busts (Gjedrem,
2019). Consequently, it serves as a highly interesting case study for fiscal policy research.
In this Norwegian fiscal framework, we will briefly review three key elements of fiscal and
monetary policy which interplay, as illustrated in figure 2.2. All government revenues
resulting from petroleum extraction are transferred in their entirety to (1) the Sovereign
Wealth Fund, from which revenues subject to (2) a fiscal rule are used to cover national
budget deficits. In addition, (3) a stable inflation target and a flexible exchange rate
regime operated through the Central Bank supports stabilization, aiming to smooth cycles
in production and employment (Gjedrem, 2019).
2.2 The Sovereign Wealth Fund 7
Figure 2.2: The Sovereign Wealth Fund Mechanism (Gjedrem, 2019).
2.2 The Sovereign Wealth Fund
In the discussion on Norwegian fiscal policy, a key element is government revenue related
to petroleum extraction, which is typically large and often fluctuating subject to supply
and demand shocks (NOU2015:9, 2015). Examples of sudden large changes to petroleum
revenues include the sharp price falls after the 1973 and 2020 OPEC disagreements, as well
as the 2014 oil crisis which affected firms in regions heavily dependent on industries related
to petroleum extraction (Grytten and Hunnes, 2016). Therefore, all petroleum-related
government revenues since 1992 have been directly transferred to the Government Pension
Fund Global, commonly known as the Sovereign Wealth Fund, accumulating government
revenues from petroleum extraction for all future generations. One objective of creating
the fund was to limit fluctuating fiscal policy, as the room for maneuver would vary greatly
in relation to volatile petroleum prices when these revenues were directly covering national
budget deficits. This presented a challenge for long-term planning of welfare development
and infrastructure, and could additionally cause a procyclical fiscal policy regime in which
decisions are expansive in economic booms and contractive in busts (NOU2015:9, 2015).
The financial assets of the fund was placed exclusively abroad in order to function as a
diversified stabilization tool, in which a countercyclical exchange rate balances out the
funds worth measured in Norwegian kroner.
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Furthermore, following the introduction of the fiscal rule in 2001, the revenues covering
fiscal budget deficits are solely based on the expected real returns of the fund. Initially, the
Norwegian fiscal rule aimed towards a balanced withdrawal of petroleum-related revenue at
an expected 4% real return rate, which was later reduced to 3% after recommendations of
the ’Thøgersen-committee’ (NOU2015:9, 2015). Thus, a steady accumulation of Sovereign
wealth in the fund has been accompanied by a gradual increase in the spending of petroleum
revenues. At the same time, Norway is in a unique position through constant withdrawals
of the returns of financial assets, as opposed to paying interest on annual budget deficits
which many countries are presently forced to do (Varoufakis, 2016). Hence, Norwegian
fiscal policy is protected to a larger extent against increasing future budget deficits and
periods of forced contractive policy-making. Importantly, however, the steady increase in
the budget deficit has not been entirely automatic as the fiscal rule characterizes fiscal
policy as a tool for the stabilization of total production and employment.
2.4 Inflation Targeting and Floating Exchange Rate
After a long period of large business cycle fluctuations and policy-making that amplified
these fluctuations, a fixed monetary policy regime had proved troublesome (Corsetti
et al., 2016). Based on these experiences, particularly economic crises in the 70s and 90s,
monetary policy shifted towards inflation targeting. Although officially announced by the
Norwegian Ministry of Finance in 2001, informal implementation of inflation targeting
started in June 1999 with an aim of 2 percent inflation over time (Corsetti et al., 2016).
Since then, the mandate for the Central Bank has been to stabilize the trajectory of the
Norwegian krone and corresponding expectations of future exchange rate developments.
Moreover, the Bank is to interplay with fiscal policy in supporting a stable development in
output and employment. The inflation target is currently followed through an operational
target of an annual consumer price inflation of approximately 2 percent.
The floating exchange rate of the Norwegian krone is further affected by the fiscal policy
transmission mechanism through changes to aggregate demand. Through this transmission
mechanism, fiscal policy influences the domestic interest rate and inflation, as well as
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expectations of inflation and currency developments (Gjedrem, 2019). As a small, open
economy that largely depends on trade, the floating exchange rate acts as a stabilization
tool in depreciating the currency in economic downturns. As the value of Norwegian
goods and wages measured in kroner become relatively more competitive domestically
and abroad, this floating exchange rate somewhat offsets business cycle fluctuations.
With this framework in mind, we aim to analyse the effects of exogenous fiscal changes on
the Norwegian economy. The majority of fiscal policy literature discusses the direction
and magnitude of fiscal multipliers. Following the definition in previous Norwegian
literature, we refer to fiscal multipliers as the stimulating effects on macroeconomic
variables (predominantly GDP) resulting from a given change in a fiscal policy measure
(Boug et al., 2017). Therefore, our presentation of related literature is structured around




Predominantly, previous literature analyses the dynamic effects of fiscal multipliers through
a time horizon. Furthermore, peak multipliers are widely used to compare results following
Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Peak multipliers represent the maximum fiscal multipliers





In Equation 3.1, ∆Ymax represents the maximum change in GDP while ∆X0 ∈ (G0, T0),
represents the initial change in government spending or net taxes. The modeling and
estimation of these effects on output diverge substantially both in underlying theoretical
assumptions and identification methods of fiscal shocks. First, economic activity is
differently influenced depending on the characteristics of the fiscal change in question. For
instance, increased military spending and increased funding for employment in healthcare,
though equal in magnitude in the national budget, will produce different fiscal multipliers
on an economy. Second, the sign and size of fiscal multipliers are highly sensitive to
the underlying theoretical assumptions of the model through which they are assessed.
A central divergence in this regard is whether or not agents are forward-looking, an
assumption founded in microeconomic theory. Models that ignore the forward-looking
behavior of rational agents, do not take into account the intertemporal budget constraints
facing consumers, firms and governments alike. Therefore, expected future changes in
income and output do not affect behavior in the current period, contrary to forward-
looking models where agents with rational expectations incorporate future implications
(Hebous, 2011).
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3.2 Standard Keynesian Models
Crucial assumptions of Keynesian theory, as described in John Maynard Keynes’ General
Theory (1936), are that prices are sticky and that consumption is a constant fraction of
net income in the current period (Hebous, 2011). As such, GDP in Keynesian models is
demand-determined in the short run and subject to effects from domestic fiscal policy.
Standard Keynesian theory predicts that increased government spending stimulates
economic activity through an accelerator effect and raises output, all else equal. In
turn, this growth in production increases the disposable income of households and raises
private consumption. Hence, expansive fiscal spending yields an increase in output, total
investment and consumption. As prices in Keynesian models are nominally rigid and
demand for money depends on income, increased output causes a raise in the domestic
interest rate. This interest rate hike may prevail over the accelerator effect and lead to a
crowding out of private investment, depending on the propensity of private investment
to income and the specific change in the interest rate (Gaber et al., 2013). In contrast,
an increase in government revenue through tax raises has a negative effect on output.
Increased taxes reduce disposable income, causing a contraction in private consumption
and in turn aggregate demand and output. However, in the traditional Keynesian model,
taxes affect households only through a negative wealth effect in the current period and are
therefore considerably smaller than spending multipliers in such models (Hebous, 2011).
Nevertheless, theoretical literature is increasingly built on Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium (DSGE) models which incorporate forward-looking agents with rational
expectations, and consequently predict different multipliers.
3.3 DSGE Models
DSGE models incorporate intertemporal aggregate relations where consumers maximise
lifetime expected utility following the permanent income hypothesis of Friedman (1957),
while firms maximise profit constrained by available technology. Furthermore, the
government operates within a budget constraint subject to an intertemporal fiscal
rule. Two essential DSGE models, namely Neoclassical models and New-Keynesian
(NK) models, primarily differ in two assumptions. Neoclassical models assume perfect
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competition and flexible prices, whereas NK models combine Keynesian assumptions of
nominally rigid prices and imperfect competition with forward-looking agents.
Neoclassical Models
Similar to Keynesian predictions, Neoclassical models predict positive multipliers of
spending shocks and negative (distortionary) multipliers from tax shocks, although
differing in underlying mechanisms (Ramey, 2019). In contrast to the Keynesian world,
forward-looking consumers understand that increased government spending in the current
period must be debt-financed through increased future taxes. Therefore, expansive fiscal
policy measures yield a negative wealth effect through an increase in the present value
of future tax liabilities. Subject to Ricardian equivalence, households save due to a
negative effect on permanent income rather than consume to the extent that standard
Keynesian models predict (Hebous, 2011). As government spending extracts resources
from the private sector in the neoclassical world, forward-looking consumers compensate
for a reduction in expected future income by increasing their labour supply which
increases production. This increase in hours worked causes investment to increase as the
higher steady state of hours worked requires larger investments to accumulate capital
stock. Consequently, expansive fiscal policy causes private consumption to decline whilst
investment and output increases. Similarly, due to this large effect on permanent income,
distortionary tax increases can yield large negative multipliers on the economy (Ramey,
2019).
New-Keynesian DSGE Models
The New-Keynesian DSGE framework incorporates the neoclassical assumptions of forward-
looking agents combined with Keynesian elements of monopolistic competition and sticky
prices (Hebous, 2011). Similar to neoclassical models, government spending in NK-DSGE
models yield increased output and reduced consumption. Due to the intertemporal negative
wealth effect, forward-looking consumers reduce consumption and increase labour supply,
boosting output. However, due to the assumptions of sticky prices and monopolistic
competition, the increase in labour demand caused by higher production balances out the
raise in labour supply. Hence, real wages increase after expansive fiscal policy rather than
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decrease as in the neoclassical models (Pappa, 2009). Moreover, due to price rigidities,
NK-DSGE models predict a crowding out of private investment as the interest rate rises
due to increased output. Nevertheless, Christiano et al. (2011) show that in the case of a
strictly binding zero bound on nominal interest rate, the expansive fiscal multipliers effect
on output causes expected inflation to increase. In turn, this causes a decline in the real
interest rate in the economy and in such an economy, government spending multipliers
are relatively large. Similar to neoclassical models, due to the large importance of an
intertemporal wealth effect, distortionary tax changes can yield large negative effects on
output. In summary, expansive fiscal policy in NK-DSGE models yield similar predictions
to Keynesian theory with respect to increased output and reduced private investment,
whilst agreeing with neoclassical models on a negative effect on private consumption.
Most empirical literature has aimed to qualitatively assess the predictions of these models





Predominantly, studies of fiscal policy attempt to estimate multipliers derived from fiscal
shocks. There is essentially no single characterization of a fiscal policy shock. Rather,
fiscal policy captures a wide array of policy actions, encompassing countless different
tax structures and various types of government spending. In empirical literature, these
fiscal shocks are defined as primitive, exogenous and/or unanticipated changes to a fiscal
variable (Ramey, 2016). Hence, identified fiscal shocks have to represent unanticipated
movements that are orthogonal to other exogenous shocks and other endogenous variables
in the model, both current and lagged. In contrast, fiscal policy changes that occur
in response to business cycle movements are characterized as automatic stabilizers and
discretionary fiscal policy, respectively. The former comprises already established features
of the government spending and tax systems that automatically respond to business cycle
fluctuations, whereas the latter encompasses all policy measures enacted reactively to
such fluctuations. Thus, truly exogenous fiscal shocks are uncorrelated to the state of the
economy, for instance a sudden change in income tax after a shift in political power or
substantial government spending in the outbreak of war (Ramey, 2016).
4.2 Identification of Fiscal Shocks
Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) models have become the primary tool to estimate
multipliers of fiscal shocks since the formative work of Sims (1980). In a response to
computational models structured around heavy theoretical assumptions, SVAR models
aim to let the data speak for itself. In a multivariate model where connected time series
variables are interdependent, one can disentangle the structural relationships between
variables and infer economic meaning to structural shocks.
Though predominantly utilized to estimate effects of monetary policy, the use of SVAR
models has grown gradually through the aforementioned renaissance in fiscal research
(Ramey, 2019). Indeed, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) argues that the intrinsic mechanisms
of fiscal policy make the SVAR approach better suited for assessing fiscal shocks than
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monetary ones. First, whereas monetary policy frequently acts in correlation with business
cycle fluctuations, output stabilization is rarely the main driver of fiscal policy changes.
Second, as opposed to monetary policy, the slow process of fiscal policy decision-making
and implementation implies that there are negligible fiscal responses to contemporaneous
output changes. Hence, we can compute estimates of the automatic effects of output
movements, and by implication decouple and estimate truly exogenous fiscal shocks
(Blanchard and Perotti, 2002).
Although straightforward in principle, the identification of these exogenous fiscal shocks,
i.e. isolating exogenous movements in fiscal variables from endogenous ones, is empirically
challenging. Moreover, the methodology utilized for identification can produce large
variation in the magnitude of fiscal multipliers, as well as some qualitative divergence
(Caldara and Kamps, 2017). Several studies since Sims (1980) have argued for different
strategies, and the next section briefly describes three widely used approaches to identify
fiscal shocks.
The Blanchard-Perotti Approach
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) provides a seminal contribution to fiscal policy research
building upon the work of Sims (1980), identifying both government spending and tax
shocks. Essentially, the study employs institutional information and externally computed
estimates for structural relationships to calculate and restrict contemporaneous responses
among the endogenous variables.
The method assumes that all unanticipated fluctuations in spending and taxes are
caused by either (1) automatic stabilizers, (2) discretionary responses to business cycle
fluctuations or (3) truly exogenous fiscal shocks, which are the shocks subject to analysis.
Furthermore, due to the discussed lags in policy implementation, Blanchard and Perotti
(2002) assumes that there is no discretionary response within the current period, restricting
the contemporaneous relationship to zero. Thus, economic assumptions and institutional
information are utilized to restrict contemporaneous relationships between the variables.
Whereas these restrictions are strictly limited to zero in the recursive ordering of Sims
(1980), Blanchard and Perotti (2002) considers invalidations of the zero restrictions caused
by factors such as forward-looking behavior or asymmetrical information. For instance,
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through an external calculation of the elasticity of taxes to movements in GDP, they
identify structural relationships and by implication identify exogenous tax shocks.
Although providing a solid basis for further fiscal policy research and improvements
in identification methodology, the Blanchard-Perotti approach has faced certain
criticism. First, the method struggles to account for anticipation effects of fiscal
policy and anticipated responses prior to the implementation of a fiscal policy
change may cause a bias. Second, related literature argue that strong economic
assumptions imposed by the approach might direct the model towards certain results
(Mountford and Uhlig, 2009). Finally, the estimates of tax multipliers are highly
sensitive to the calculation of tax elasticity to output, which has been questioned as an
inappropriate measure to estimate structural tax relationships (Caldara and Kamps, 2008).
The Narrative Approach
In contrast, the narrative approach aims to identify exogenous shocks by reviewing large
amounts of historical documents and announcements on fiscal policy changes (Romer and
Romer, 2010). The approach utilizes such information to construct a rich time series
to describe the underlying reasons and quantities of changes to fiscal variables (Ramey,
2016). Typically, information on military spending and legislative tax changes has been
applied to construct a series for analysis. Through such an assessment, the aim is to
identify changes to spending and/or taxes that are unrelated to other factors which either
affect current or future economic development (Ramey, 2016). These changes are treated
as exogenous and thus constitute the fiscal shocks.
Studies that apply the narrative approach for identification tend to estimate smaller
multipliers in the short run and much higher long-term multipliers (Ramey, 2019),
illustrating the significance of identification strategy. Moreover, as opposed to other
SVAR models, the narrative approach is more able to account for anticipation effects,
which has been a general challenge in SVAR literature. However, some narrative-based
research has faced criticism for assuming that the approach alone secures exogeneity in
identification, which is not necessarily the case (Ramey, 2016). In addition, the approach
may falsely define shocks of one character to hold for all subsequent shocks, and lastly it
is time and resource consuming.
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The Sign Restrictions Approach
Finally, a central identification method of fiscal policy shocks is the sign restrictions
approach pioneered by Faust (1998) and Uhlig (1997), which was adapted to fiscal policy
research by Mountford and Uhlig (2009). In contrast to the Blanchard-Perotti method,
the sign restrictions approach impose assumptions only on the sign of the responses of
endogenous variables following a fiscal shock. As we utilize this approach, it is explained in
detail in our empirical strategy. The strategy was developed in response to the conventional
approaches, which Uhlig (2005) argues are too restricted by theoretical assumptions. In
order to estimate the true values of these effects, studies leveraging sign restrictions aim
to limit assumptions and be agnostic with respect to contemporaneous relationships.
Similarly, where conventional methods rely on a strict chain of causation within the
model, the sign restrictions approach is less restrictive and all variables are estimated
simultaneously in the system of equations.
As the scope of this paper is limited, we have restricted the overview of identification
methods to the three main approaches. Ramey (2016) provides a detailed description of
several other identification methods and the results of these. Next, we will provide a brief
synthesis of empirical findings utilizing the above approaches.
4.3 Empirical Results
Empirical studies of fiscal shocks have mainly investigated the direction and size of the
effects on output. With respect to the qualitative direction, one intends to assess whether
effects of fiscal policy shocks are empirically consistent with theoretical predictions.
Concerning the quantitative size, literature aims to estimate the fiscal multipliers of
government spending and tax shocks, respectively. When discussing ranges of spending or
tax multipliers in empirical results, we refer to the variation of multipliers throughout
a time horizon (typically 20 or 25 quarters). Impact multipliers represent the initial
effect on output, referring to the dollar change in GDP in the first quarter following a
one-dollar spending increase. Meanwhile, the aforementioned peak multipliers represent
the maximum effect in dollars found throughout the horizon relative to the initial fiscal
shock.
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Government Spending Shocks
Generally, the empirical literature estimating fiscal policy shocks finds qualitative results
which are consistent with theoretical predictions of New-Keynesian DSGE models regarding
output and investment: a positive government spending shock yields a rise in GDP and
consumption, whilst private investment falls. However, many results from SVAR analysis
imply that consumption increases following a spending shock, elements consistent with
standard Keynesian theory. A selection of relevant SVAR literature on government
spending multipliers is summarized in Table 4.2.
Summarizing SVAR studies of spending multipliers, the majority of estimates are in the
range of 0.4 to 1.5 (Ramey, 2019). Predominantly, these studies are conducted on US
data. Among the seminal papers estimating spending multipliers, Blanchard and Perotti
(2002) find a consistently positive effect on GDP. Increased spending stimulates output
on impact by 0.78 cents per dollar change, and peaks at a multiplier of 1.29. Perotti
(2005) and Caldara and Kamps (2008) expand the approach to control for monetary
policy shocks and find comparable ranges of spending multipliers. Similarly, these studies
find positive effects of government spending on private consumption and the opposite on
private investment. Ramey (2011) compares the effects found through these studies with
findings from the narrative approach, in an attempt to incorporate anticipation effects.
The study finds a positive effect on GDP, with similar multipliers as the studies above. In
addition, the negative effects on private investment approximate previous studies, whereas
the study finds a crowding out effect on consumption, consistent with neoclassical theory.
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) applies a similar methodology to estimate multipliers
dependent on the state of the economy, finding that spending multipliers are substantially
larger in economic contractions than expansions. Mountford and Uhlig (2009), our main
source of inspiration for the sign restrictions approach, finds a smaller effect on GDP
on impact with 0.65 cents per dollar change, which is also the peak spending multiplier.
Moreover, the study does not find significant effects on private consumption or investment.
As mentioned, there are limited studies conducted on economies apart from the U.S.,
which offer mixed support to previous literature. The aforementioned Perotti (2005)
estimates spending multipliers on five OECD countries, and finds diverging effects outside
of the U.S. through different time periods. When estimating smaller economies such
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as Australia and Canada, effects of increased spending are generally more inconclusive
with different qualitative effects through different sample periods. Furthermore, Perotti
(2005) and Afonso and Sousa (2009) find counterintutive, negative effects of increased
spending on GDP in Germany and the UK. Among the limited SVAR studies of small,
open economies approximating Norway, Grdović Gnip (2014) finds an impact multiplier
of 0.33 in Croatia, while Kemp (2020) estimates impact multipliers of 0.11 and 0.36 (with
recursive ordering and sign restrictions, respectively) in South Africa. Finally, Parkyn and
Vehbi (2014) finds an ambiguous range of spending multipliers from -0.1 to 0.4 in New
Zealand. With the exception of Kemp (2020), all of the studies in Table 4.1 outside of
the U.S. employ a version of the conventional recursive ordering approach for identification.
Table 4.1: Summary of Spending Multipliers
Study Main Sample Identification Approach Spending Multipliers Country
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) Quarterly, 1960–1997 Blanchard-Perotti approach 0.9–1.29 U.S.

















Mountford and Uhlig (2009) Quarterly, 1955–2000 Sign restrictions 0.65 U.S.











Ramey (2011) Quarterly, 1939–2008and subsamples Narrative Approach 0.6 –1.2 US
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) Quarterly, 1950–2008 Blanchard-Perotti approach controllingfor professional forecasts and news
Expansion: 0.3 to 0.8
Recession: 1–3.6 U.S.
Gnip (2014) Quarterly, 1996-2011 Blanchard-Perotti approach 0.33 (peak) Croatia
Parkyn and Vehbi (2014) Quarterly, 1983-2010 Blanchard-Perotti approach 0.2-0.4 New Zealand
Asche and Kristjiansson (2019) Quarterly, 1978–2017 Blanchard-Perotti approach 0.4 Norway









Although empirical literature often converge qualitatively on the effects of tax shocks on
GDP, findings are more ambiguous with regards to the effect on components of GDP. A
comparative analysis of Caldara and Kamps (2008) finds that differences are mainly due
to the size of automatic stabilizers and differences in the external estimates utilized in
identification. Predominantly, empirical literature finds negative tax multipliers to output,
consumption and investment (Ramey, 2016). This is consistent with the negative wealth
effects in the current period both in standard Keynesian and DSGE models. Moreover,
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these tax multipliers are generally less impactful than spending multipliers in the short-
term, but grow to relatively large multipliers over time. A selection of relevant SVAR
literature of tax multipliers is summarized in Table 4.2.
Most empirical literature, primarily on U.S. data, finds persistently negative effects on
GDP and components thereof. However, the size of the multipliers vary greatly. Many
studies of tax shocks build upon Blanchard and Perotti (2002), which utilizes institutional
information to externally estimate the elasticity of net taxes to GDP and identify shocks
by implication. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) finds a negative effect on impact of -0.69
cents per dollar tax increase, with a maximum multiplier of -0.78 after a year. Similarly,
the study finds mildly negative effects on private consumption and investment. However,
the approach has faced criticism as the identification of tax shocks is highly dependent on
the externally estimated elasticity of tax to output. This is illustrated by Caldara and
Kamps (2008), which find that tax multipliers change significantly when estimating this
elasticity endogenously in the model. Rather, Mountford and Uhlig (2009) applies the
sign restriction approach to identify present-value tax multipliers within the model, more
similar to the approach of Caldara and Kamps (2008). Mountford and Uhlig (2009) finds
a persistently negative effect of tax shocks, with a peak multiplier of -3.6 within three
years. Romer and Romer (2010) finds similar results to Mountford and Uhlig (2009) when
employing the narrative approach to identify shocks, calculating tax multipliers at a range
of -2.5 to -3 within three years of a tax shock.
Similar to spending shocks, the effects of tax shocks found in studies of other OECD
countries are more ambiguous. For instance, Afonso and Sousa (2009) finds a
counterintuitive, positive effect on GDP in Germany and the U.K., whereas Perotti (2005)
finds a positive effect of tax increases in Australia and Germany. The few studies of small,
open economies commonly find smaller tax multiplier than those estimated in the US and
larger countries, with tax multipliers such as -0.03 in Croatia (Grdović Gnip, 2014), -0,27
in South Africa (Kemp, 2020) and an average of -0.4 in a study of various small states
across the world (Alichi et al., 2019).
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Table 4.2: Summary of Tax Multipliers
Study Main Sample Identification Implied tax multipliers Country
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) Quarterly, 1960–1997 Blanchard-Perotti approach 0.78 - 1.33 US

















Mountford and Uhlig (2009) Quarterly, 1955–2000 Sign restrictions - 3.6 US











Romer and Romer (2010) Quarterly, 1947–2007 Narrative approach -3 (peak) US
Favero and Giavazzi (2012) Quarterly, 1950–2006 Narrative approach -0.5 US
Mertens and Ravn (2012) Quarterly, 1950–2006 Proxy SVAR using Romer-Romerunanticipated shocks -3 US
Gnip (2014) Quarterly, 1996-2011 Blanchard-Perotti Approach 0.04 Croatia
Parkyn and Vehbi (2014) Quarterly, 1983-2010 Blanchard-Perotti approach -0.2-0.2 New Zealand








Fiscal Multipliers in Norway
Concerning Norway, Boug et al. (2017) provides estimates of spending multipliers in
the economy through simulations in the macroeconometric model MODAG of Statistics
Norway. Contrary to more aggregated DSGE models, the model contains a detailed
characterization of all government revenues and expenditures. The study finds a spending
multiplier which starts at 1.0 in the short-term (within four quarters) and gradually
grows to 1.6 within eight years, mainly driven through an increase in public employment.
Notably, this rather large multiplier could be enhanced by the theoretical assumptions
anchored in the model, where agents are backward looking and adaptive rather than
forward looking, in contrast to DSGE models.
To the best of our knowledge, the only SVAR-based estimations of fiscal multipliers in
Norway are found by Asche and Kristjánsson (2019),1 which follows the Blanchard-Perotti
approach to identify fiscal shocks in Norway. They find that spending shocks positively
affects output, albeit with a smaller multiplier than commonly found in larger economies.
On impact, Asche and Kristjánsson (2019) finds that GDP increases by 0.43 kroner
following a one-krone spending shock, stabilizing at a multiplier of 0.5-0.6 throughout the
period. Regarding tax multipliers in Norway, Asche and Kristjánsson (2019) applies two
different methods to estimate the tax elasticity to output and consequently calculate tax
1With the exception of certain master theses, see e.g. Thuy Dinh and Vegard (2018); Lund (2005).
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multipliers. First, following Blanchard and Perotti (2002), the study externally calculates
a tax elasticity of output ranging from 0.9 to 1.8, implying that a 1% increase in GDP
raises net taxes from 0.9% to 1.8% within the current period. With this tax elasticity, the
tax multiplier is positive ranging from 0.1 to 0.4. In contrast, estimating the tax elasticity
to output endogenously in the model following Caldara and Kamps (2008), the study
finds a tax elasticity of 2.9 which yields a negative tax multiplier of -0.3. Thus, the tax
multipliers found by Asche and Kristjánsson (2019) are not conclusive.
Aiming to add novel insight to the literature of the effects of fiscal policy, we follow
Mountford and Uhlig (2009) in using the sign restrictions approach to employ an agnostic
identification strategy for fiscal shocks in a small, open economy such as Norway.
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5 Empirical Strategy
5.1 Choice of Identification Approach
Identification of structural parameters, and fiscal shocks by implication, has primarily
relied on recursive ordering since Sims (1980). The recursive ordering method utilizes a
Cholesky decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix of the reduced form residuals
in the model. In essence, restrictions are imposed to limit contemporaneous structural
relationships either to zero and/or estimated parameters in the short and long-run from
theory-based assumptions. This is the approach of Blanchard and Perotti (2002), for
instance when imposing the externally estimated elasticity of tax to output. With these
restrictions, the shocks of endogenous variables are identified in a specific order based
on prior beliefs. Hence, the recursive ordering approach implies strong assumptions on
parameters and the chain of causation within the model (Breitenlechner et al., 2019).
In contrast, the sign restrictions approach limits such assumptions on the chain of
causation and parameters describing the contemporaneous relationships. Instead of
imposing assumptions on the impact matrix itself, the approach imposes restrictions
on the direction of the impulse responses, i.e. the dynamic effects of the endogenous
variables following a shock. Moreover, the approach does not determine the sequence of
causation in the model, allowing all variables to respond to identified shocks simultaneously
(Breitenlechner et al., 2019).
5.2 SVAR and Sign Restrictions
In line with previous literature, we employ a Structural Vector Autoregressive (SVAR)
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This can further be illustrated as follows:
yt = B1 y(t−1) + ... +Bp y(t−p) + εt, (5.2)
or more compactly using the lag operator L:
B(L)yt = εt, (5.3)
where B(L) = B0 −B1L − .... − BpLP .
In Equations 5.1 - 5.3, y is a n× 1 vector containing the endogenous variables of interest.
Following Blanchard and Perotti (2002), we include logged, per capita values of real GDP,
government spending and net taxes as endogenous variables in our system. Bi represents
the n × n matrix of coefficients, and εt represents the reduced form white noise with zero
mean and a variance-covariance matrix
∑
ε = E[εt, ε
′
t], where E[εt, ε′s] = 0 for s 6= t.
Ideally, we would want to estimate the model as it is. However, due to concerns that the
reduced form residuals are often correlated, the matrix
∑
ε is not likely to be a diagonal
matrix. Hence, a shock in one variable is likely to be accompanied by a shock in another
variable and is therefore not orthogonal. In order to estimate the exogenous effects
of spending and tax shocks with economic meaning, we need to construct a structural





Biyt−i + ut (5.4)
Here, A describes the contemporaneous relationships among the endogenous variables in
yt, which is also referred to as the impact matrix. Bi is an n × n coefficient matrix of
the variables, and ut are independent structural shocks with
∑
u = E[ut, u
′
t] = I.
In order to identify and characterize the structural shocks, further information on the
contemporaneous relationships between the variables in A is required. Conventionally,
identification is achieved through identifying all fundamental shocks, denoted m, and
characterizing the entire A matrix. To this aim, m(m−1)
2
restrictions must be inferred on
the A matrix. To solve this identification challenge, we apply the sign restriction approach
as proposed by Uhlig (2005).
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Formal Representation of Sign Restrictions
The underlying mechanisms of sign restrictions can be illustrated through a moving





In this equation Φi encompasses the reduced form impulse responses, where Φ0 = I and
Φi =
∑∞
n=1 Φi−jBj . With the use of Cholesky decomposition we assume that
∑
ε = PP ′.
It then follows that since yt =
∑∞
n=1 ΦiPP
−1εt−1, the structural variance-covariance matrix






−1′ = P−1PP ′ P−1′ = I. Since P is a lower
triangular matrix, it has K(K + 1)/2 free parameters, so all parameters of P are exactly
identified. As a result, the order condition for identification is satisfied. We would as such
obtain the structural impulse responses denoted Θi, as Θi = ΦiP .
While the Cholesky decomposition imposes a recursive order with zero restrictions on
the contemporaneous relationships, the sign restriction approach imposes restrictions
directly on the impulse responses Θi given a horizon i. Thus, it follows that one would not
exactly identify the structural shocks through matrix A, as multiple orthogonalizations
might be consistent with the imposed sign restrictions. In the implementation of sign
restrictions one decomposes the matrix containing the contemporaneous relationships, A,
into two components, A = PQ, where P is the lower triangular Cholesky factor of
∑
ε
and Q is an orthonormal matrix with QQ′ = I. Note that the matrix P, which serves to
identify the structural shocks in the recursive approach, here serves merely as a useful
computational tool without affecting the results. Conversely, the matrix Q plays an
important role in the sign restrictions approach because it collects the identifying weights
with each column of Q corresponding to a particular structural shock. To obtain another
orthogonal representation of the impulse responses in Equation 5.5, we can now further
multiply Θi = ΦiP with a random orthonormal matrix Q. It will then still hold that∑




−1′ Q ] = I.
The identification approach further takes several draws from the posterior of the
VAR coefficients and the variance-covariance matrix of the reduced-form residuals.
For each draw, the obtained orthogonal impulse response is checked for a match
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against the imposed positive or negative sign restrictions. If they match the
sign restrictions, the impulse responses bear a structural meaning and are saved. If
not, they are discarded. For further elaboration on sign restrictions, see Arias et al. (2014).
Identifying Assumptions
In order to characterize meaningful relationships, economic theory and experience should
be emphasized when imposing assumptions on the direction of the sign restrictions (Uhlig,
2017). However, these assumptions are not necessarily agreed upon in literature. Following
seminal empirical literature using sign restrictions, notably Mountford and Uhlig (2009),
we impose restrictions based on the identifying assumptions in Table 5.1. Although one
aims to be agnostic in the analysis, some identifying assumptions are needed to interpret
relationships (Mountford and Uhlig, 2009). According to Paustian (2007), the model is
incapable of precise identification without sufficient restrictions to pin down the effects on
the endogenous variables. In addition to the signs imposed on fiscal shocks, business cycle
shocks are identified to control for movements correlated to business cycle fluctuations.
Table 5.1: Imposed Sign Restrictions
GDP Spending Net Taxes
Business Cycle Shock + +
Spending Shock +
Tax Shock +
Note: ’+’ indicates that the impulse responses are restricted to be positive after a shock.
Similarly, ’-’ restrict the responses to be negative. Lastly, blank fields indicate no restrictions
Fiscal policy shocks are identified through imposed sign restrictions on the impulse
responses of the fiscal variables, and the requirement that they are orthogonal to business
cycle shocks (Mountford and Uhlig, 2009). Spending and tax shocks are defined as
persistent increases in government spending and net taxes, respectively, for at least four
consecutive quarters. We employ tight identifying restrictions of at least four quarters in
order to disregard transitory shocks to fiscal variables, for instance cases where spending
rises on impact and falls again after one or two periods.
Moreover, business cycle shocks are defined as shocks which persistently moves output
and net taxes for four quarters after the shock. The inclusion of business cycle shocks is
crucial for identification of fiscal policy shocks, as it allows us to control for co-movements
in output and taxes. When output and net taxes move in the same direction, a business
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cycle upswing is assumed to yield increased tax revenue rather than the opposite. This
assumption is reasonable in view with theoretical and empirical literature (Mountford and
Uhlig, 2009), and is important to avoid incorrectly attributing positive GDP responses to
tax shocks (Caldara and Kamps, 2017). Moreover, the values that are blank in Table 5.1
are not restricted to any value and thus the approach does not affect these relationships.
Several studies have proposed different algorithms to implement these sign restrictions.
In recent years, the computational modelling of Mountford and Uhlig (2009) has been
questioned with respect to the proclaimed agnosticism when identifying shocks. In
particular, Arias et al. (2014) argues that the algorithm unknowingly imposes additional
restrictions, generating biased impulse response functions and artificially narrow confidence
bands. In response, Arias et al. (2014, 2018) builds upon the work of Mountford and
Uhlig (2009) to develop an algorithm which takes into account such shortcomings. In our
analysis we therefore use a replication algorithm of Arias et al. (2014) to conduct our sign
restricted approach.2
5.3 Other Specifications and Choice of Estimator
In a Structural VAR analysis, the choice of appropriate lag lengths is a central point of
discussion. An insufficient amount of lags could lead to a loss of important information or
cause biased estimates due to autocorrelation in the residuals. On the other hand, more
lags might make the model excessively complex and cause imprecise estimates (Bjørnland
and Thorsrud, 2015). With relatively few observations of quarterly data from 1978 to 2017,
this could be an issue for our VAR model. Utilizing formal information criterion functions,
both the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)
suggest two lags with our baseline model. However, according to DeSerres et al. (1995),
applying the information criteria can yield too short suggested lag lengths. Although
Mountford and Uhlig (2009) includes six lags, four lags are common for three-variable
VAR models including those of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Asche and Kristjánsson
(2019). Accordingly, we include four lags to the endogenous variables in our model. We
test the sensitivity of our baseline model with two and six lags, following recommendations
of our AIC/BIC criteria (two lags) and studies such as Mountford and Uhlig (2009) which
2The approach is based on the ZeroSignVar package developed by Breitenlechner et al. (2019), and
conducted in MATLAB. For a more detailed description of the software process, see Appendix A1.
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applies six lags. This does not significantly affect the results of our baseline model (see
Appendix A5.1).
Following Uhlig (2005), we estimate our model using Bayesian techniques. This
includes utilizing an uninformative Normal – Inverse – Wishart Prior as our prior and a
corresponding Normal-Wishart density as the posterior distribution. This is a flat prior
commonly used in literature which returns point estimates that closely resemble those
of traditional ordinary least squares method. The rationale behind applying Bayesian
techniques is mainly built on two arguments. First, the Bayesian approach does not
require special treatment if unit roots are present in the time series (Sims and Zha, 1998).
As unit roots often appear in macroeconomic variables, our series would require special
treatment to achieve stationarity. However, this may be undesirable as important data
points could be lost in the process, as Sims (1980) argues. As such, a Bayesian approach
proves beneficial to the estimation of macroeconomic outcomes. Second, as most studies
implementing a sign restrictions approach use Bayesian techniques, it is in our interest to
follow this literature to obtain a comparative basis for discussion.
Although the Bayesian VAR technique in principle allows for a trend present in the
variables (Nalban et al., 2015), most previous literature including Blanchard and Perotti
(2002) and Asche and Kristjánsson (2019) have included time trends. Consequently, we
include a linear time trend in our VAR model.3 However, we test the sensitivity of our
results when excluding the linear time trend similar to Mountford and Uhlig (2009),
which argues that the exclusion yields more robust results although leading to a slight
misspecification. Excluding a linear time trend does not significantly affect our results,
illustrated in Appendix A5.1.
3When applying the above specifications, the Lagrange multiplier test in Appendix A6.5 indicates that
there is no autocorrelation in the residuals in the VAR. Importantly, the eigenvalue stability condition is
satisfied, implying that the model is stable.
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6 Data
6.1 Collection of Data
This thesis utilizes panel data of Norwegian macroeconomic variables. The data in our
baseline model is collected from Statistics Norway with quarterly frequency over the time
period 1978Q1:2017Q4.
First, our three-variable VAR model combines quarterly series of Norwegian GDP,
government spending and net taxes. GDP and government spending are acquired from the
publicly available national accounts presented by Statistics Norway, whereas the net taxes
variable is collected from the KVARTS database, provided by the Norwegian Ministry of
Finance. GDP refers to the market value of GDP for Mainland Norway, which has become
the main emphasis when assessing effects on the Norwegian economy. Mainland GDP
excludes petroleum production and international shipping. As a large part of gross product
in Norwegian petroleum extraction is derived from resource rent taxation, this exaggerates
the importance of the sector in terms of GDP relative to the input of production factors.
Shipping, meanwhile, is excluded as it has shown to have limited explanatory power with
respect to fluctuations in economic activity (Eika and Olsen, 2008).
In line with previous literature (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Mountford and Uhlig, 2009),
we combine public consumption and gross public investment in government spending. In
addition, we follow the approach of Asche and Kristjánsson (2019) on Norwegian data
and deduct quarterly depreciation of government physical capital. The data series for
depreciation is provided by the Ministry of Finance. Similarly, for a comparative basis with
previous literature, we estimate taxes through a calculation of quarterly net tax revenues.
Following Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Mountford and Uhlig (2009), net taxes are
defined as total public revenues less transfers and net capital interest. Transfers include
social and other transfers (e.g. foreign aid), which are typically regarded in literature as
negative taxes and thus excluded from the variable. Furthermore, similar to Asche and
Kristjánsson (2019), we deduct all petroleum revenues from the net taxes variable. In line
with the fiscal framework described in section 2, the deduction is made as government
revenue from petroleum exploration is transferred in its entirety to the Sovereign Wealth
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Fund, and gradually phased into the economy corresponding to the expected real return
of the fund (Gjedrem, 2019). In addition, similar variable calculations as in relevant
literature aid us in not obscuring the results through differentiating in more than one
aspect, the identification method, and achieve comparable results to those of Asche and
Kristjánsson (2019).
Moreover, we expand our baseline model in a sensitivity analysis. First, we estimate a
five-variable VAR including private consumption and private investment from 1978:Q1 to
2017:Q4. As components of GDP, both private consumption and private investment were
also collected from the national accounts of Statistics Norway. Private consumption
encompasses quarterly consumption of households and ideal organisations. Private
investment, meanwhile, includes all gross real investment of Mainland Norway less
government investment and residential investment, in accordance with previous literature
(Mountford and Uhlig, 2009).
Second, we analyze sensitivity of our baseline results in a five-variable VAR controlling
for monetary policy shocks. To this end, we include the Norwegian Inter Bank Offered
Rate (NIBOR) and the aforementioned GDP deflator. The NIBOR rate represents the
3-month interbank rate in Norway. The time series were collected from the Federal Reserve
database (FRED), and encompasses the longest period for which NIBOR is available from
1979 to 2017. This implies that there are four less observations of the NIBOR rate, and
thus the second sensitivity analysis is conducted from 1979:Q1 to 2017:Q4. In addition,
we include a GDP deflator to the five-variable model which we construct based on fixed
and current prices of Mainland GDP. This construction is described below.
6.2 Treatment of Data
With the exception of net taxes and government depreciation, the data collected from
Statistics Norway were obtained in fixed 2018 prices. Thus, to obtain comparable real
values for net taxes and government depreciation, we followed previous empirical literature
and deflated the aforementioned nominal series. Net taxes were deflated using the GDP
deflator for mainland GDP as is commonly done in literature, while depreciation was
deflated using its own deflator.
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The GDP deflator with index (2018 = 100) was constructed using the ratios of fixed
2018 prices and nominal prices of quarterly Mainland GDP, as presented in Statistics
Norway’s national accounts. Moreover, we constructed a Mainland GDP deflator as
to not bias our results using a deflator incorporating inflation from petroleum activity.
Alternative to the constructed GDP deflator, one could consider implementing the CPI-
ATE (Consumer Price Index adjusted for tax changes and energy products), commonly
used by the Central Bank to target the core inflation measure. However, this measure
was not publicly available for the entire sample period. Furthermore, utilizing a GDP
deflator over a CPI measure is arguably more suited to capture broad macroeconomic
price developments. Whereas the CPI-JAE predominantly targets price developments
within consumed goods and services, the GDP deflator includes price developments in
net exports, gross investment and government spending. However, a notable caveat is
that the GDP deflator for Mainland Norway only incorporates inflation for domestically
produced goods and services, and will therefore not account for imported inflation.
The data series for government depreciation is deflated by a deflator constructed through
current and fixed 2018-prices of gross public investment. Thus, the final data series for
government spending constitutes fixed prices of government consumption and investment,
minus the deflated series of depreciation. Alternatively, we could also have used the GDP
deflator on current prices for government spending, which is previously done in literature.
However, our results do not change significantly when testing for it (see Appendix A5.1).
Thus, to obtain a comparable basis for our baseline results, we stay consistent with
previous literature on Norwegian fiscal policy (Asche and Kristjánsson, 2019) and apply
the fixed prices provided by Statistics Norway. After deflating net taxes and constructing
the combined spending series, all our data series illustrate real values in fixed 2018-prices.
Moreover, with the exception of net taxes and depreciation, the aforementioned data
series were all seasonally adjusted by Statistics Norway. To stay consistent with their
adjustments, we seasonally adjusted taxes and depreciation in a similar manner using the
X-12 Arima method. The X-12 Arima method is commonly used among statistic bureaus
and is frequently used by Statistics Norway. This transformation can be found in Appendix
A2.2. Furthermore, we divided the data series by Norwegian quarterly population to
obtain per capita values. As quarterly population data is unavailable from 1978:Q1 to
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1997:Q4, these were computed through linear interpolation of yearly data. Finally, all
variables were transformed from level to log values with the exception of the interest rate,
which is expressed in level form. This is common following previous literature (Bjørnland,
2009), as the latter variable is already measured as a ratio.
6.3 Descriptive Statistics
Our final data in the baseline model comprises quarterly observations from 1978 to 2017,4
representing the time period for which our variables of interest were available, in particular
with respect to net taxes provided by the Ministry of Finance. In real values, our data
comprises the following distribution of observations:
Table 6.1: Summary Statistics
Obs Min Max Mean Median Std
GDP 160 274 913 726 087 466 743 447 560 139 533
Government Spending 160 79 659 223 616 144 457 143 951 42 655
Net Taxes 160 51 814 150 781 94 414 91 419 34 400
Figure 6.1: Real Values of Mainland GDP, Government Spending and Net Taxes in
millions of NOK from 1978 to 2017. Shaded areas indicate recessions in Norway.
Figure 6.1 illustrates our variables in the baseline three-variable VAR model. The plotted
values are all in fixed 2018-prices and are seasonally adjusted. From the plots in 6.1 it
appears that the data series are non-stationary, but it is not clear whether the variables
demonstrate a stochastic or deterministic trend. Government spending has a seemingly
clear trend from 1978 to 2017. This is expected, as increasing petroleum revenues have been
gradually phased in to cover national budget deficits throughout the period. The series
4Summary statistics and plots of the additional data for the sensitivity analyses can be found in
Appendix A2
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of GDP illustrates a clear trend, although characterized by large fluctuations connected
to the Norwegian banking crisis and the Great Recession (shaded in the figure). Finally,
net tax revenues illustrate a more irregular trend throughout the period, and as expected
mirror the stochastic fluctuations of GDP development with respect to said recessions.
However, the graphical analysis is not sufficient to determine whether the data series
are stationary or not. Rather, we conduct an Augmented Dickey Fuller test on each of
the log-transformed data series, which can be found in Appendix A6. From the test, we
cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit root at a 5% level for any of the data series.
Thus, our data series in log-form are non-stationary. We are able to obtain stationary data
by taking the first difference of the data series. However, similar to previous literature
(Blanchard and Perotti, 2002), we keep our data in log-form as we focus our analysis on
the structural relationships of fiscal policy shocks. In this regard, differenced data could




First, we present the results from our three-variable baseline model. To obtain a solid
foundation for inference, we transform all responses of the endogenous variables to give
the krone response of each variable at a given period to the initial, one-krone shock
to spending or net taxes. Therefore, in line with previous literature (Blanchard and
Perotti, 2002; Caldara and Kamps, 2017), we divide the original impulse responses by the
standard deviation of the fiscal shock in question to compute one-krone impact shocks.
Furthermore, these impulse responses are divided by the sample average of the ratio of
the macroeconomic outcome of interest and the fiscal variable subject to a shock. The
re-scaled impulse responses thus illustrate constant, non-accumulated krone multipliers
on output, taxes and spending to a one-krone shock in either taxes or spending.
In addition, we calculate cumulative, present-value multipliers on output at each quarter
throughout 20 quarters, determined by the integral between the response of GDP and the
response of the fiscal variable subject to a shock. Several studies since Blanchard and
Perotti (2002) have argued that, although multipliers per quarter are useful for comparing
impulse response functions, cumulative multipliers that account for the relative change in
spending or tax levels are more suitable to address the relevant policy questions (Ramey,
2016). Therefore, following studies such as Perotti (2005) and Mountford and Uhlig (2009),









where yt+j and ft+j represent the responses of output and the fiscal variable at horizon j,
while r is the average nominal interest rate throughout the sample period. f/y represents
the average ratio of the fiscal variable to GDP over the sample.
Alongside the median impulse response to a fiscal shock, we present confidence bands of
the estimated effects at the 16% and 84% level, as is the standard in fiscal policy literature.
Following Sims and Zha (1998), confidence bands at these levels are commonly applied to
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better communicate the qualitative shape of the results than with 95% confidence bands.
If both the upper and lower confidence bands are on the same side of zero, the effects
are considered statistically significant in similar analyses. A caveat of these confidence
bands is that statistical significance is more easily interpreted, and thus there is a larger
possibility for type 2 errors than with 95% confidence bands.
Figure 7.1: Impulse Response Functions following a spending shock. The solid lines
describe the median impulse responses, while the broken lines represent confidence bands
at the 16% and 84%. G: Government Spending, T: Net Taxes, Y: GDP
Table 7.1: Multipliers for a Spending Shock
1st Quarter 4th Quarter 8th Quarter 12th Quarter 20th Quarter Peak
GDP 0.07 -0.21 0.08 0.26 0.48* 0.48* (20)
Spending 1.00* 0.50* 0.44* 0.40* 0.34* 1.00* (1)
Tax 0.13 -0.16 -0.09 -0.04 0.22 0.22 (20)
Cumulative 0.06 -0.15 -0.07 0.08 0.41 0.41 (20)
Following a government spending shock, all variables of interest respond on impact. A
spending shock increases government spending by unity (one-krone) in the first quarter
and steadily decreases throughout the period back towards the trend. Nevertheless, the
level of government spending is still larger after five years than what it would have been
without such a spending shock. The response of taxes following a spending shock is
close to zero in the short-term. This suggests that increases in government spending are
financed through other means than taxes, which is plausible given the Sovereign Wealth
Fund mechanism for covering budget deficits.
We find that a government spending shock has a mildly positive initial effect on output.
On impact, a one-krone spending shock raises output by 0.07 kroner. The positive impact
multiplier is expected, as theoretical and empirical literature predict positive effects,
although the effect is smaller than commonly found in empirical literature. Although
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studies of smaller economies find spending multipliers of comparable magnitude (IMF,
2018; Kemp, 2020), the positive impact multiplier in our case is not statistically significant.
Thus, it is hard to conclude with confidence on the initial effect on GDP. This is further
supported by the calculation of present-value cumulative multipliers, which follow a similar
pattern and are generally close to zero.
After the positive impact multiplier, the spending multiplier turns negative for four
quarters before gradually growing positive again. The estimated effect on GDP is positive
from the sixth quarter onwards, stabilizing at a spending multiplier of 0.5 before mean
reverting in the long run. The short period of negative multipliers is rather unexpected, as
theory and most empirical literature predict increased spending to have a positive effect
on GDP, at least in the short run. However, the short-run effects of spending shocks are
more ambiguous in studies outside of the U.S., and negative effects on GDP are found in
other OECD countries such as Germany, Canada and the U.K. (Perotti, 2005; Afonso
and Sousa, 2009).
Interestingly, the form of the impulse response function is comparable to the results of
Asche and Kristjánsson (2019), also analysing fiscal shocks in Norway. Although the
former study finds a larger and significant impact multiplier, the positive effects on GDP
in the long run approximate those found by Asche and Kristjánsson (2019). This may
suggest that the sign restrictions approach estimates a similar impulse response pattern
following spending shocks, although finding less significant multipliers in the short run.
This is consistent with previous studies employing sign restrictions for identification of
fiscal shocks (Caldara and Kamps, 2008), where the initial impact is close to zero and
insignificant before growing gradually positive and significant through the period. However,
it should be noted that estimates of the effects at longer time horizons generally offer less
credibility when extrapolating policy implications.
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Figure 7.2: Impulse Response Functions following a tax shock. The solid line describe
the median impulse responses, while the broken lines represent confidence bands at the
16% and 84%. G: Government Spending, T: Net Taxes, Y: GDP
Table 7.2: Multipliers for a Tax Shock
1st Quarter 4th Quarter 8th Quarter 12th Quarter 20th Quarter Peak
GDP -0.79* -0.19 -0.01 -0.05 -0.22 - 0.79* (1)
Spending -0.15 -0.10 -0.18* -0.23* -0.25* -0.25*(16)
Tax 1.00* 0.82* 0.53 0.35 0.04 1.00* (1)
Cumulative -0.79 -0.32 -0.22 -0.19 -0.28 -0.79 (1)
Following a tax shock, all variables of interest respond on impact. Similar to the effect of
a spending shock on the level of spending, the response of tax revenue peaks on impact
before gradually reverting. The positive effect on net tax revenue is substantially higher
for several years following the tax increase, while the level of government spending is
not particularly affected. We find that a positive tax shock yields a significant, negative
impact multiplier on GDP, where a one-krone tax increase reduces output by -0.79 kroner.
This is expected, as the central theoretical frameworks predict a negative tax multiplier.
However, the impact and peak multiplier of tax shocks is substantially larger than the
corresponding spending multipliers. This finding favors predictions of DSGE models,
as taxes only enter standard Keynesian models as a negative effect on current income,
predicting smaller multipliers than those following spending shocks.
Generally, the effect on output from a tax increase is negative throughout the time
horizon. This is consistent with most previous empirical literature, and our estimated tax
multiplier on impact is similar to the estimates found by e.g. Blanchard and Perotti (2002)
and Mountford and Uhlig (2009). However, these and other studies of tax shocks find
that the negative effects of tax shocks grows gradually and tend to peak (bottom) within
1 to 3 years (Ramey, 2016). Conversely, we find that the negative effect is strongest on
impact, after which the negative effect is weak and at times approximating zero up until
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the third year following a shock. Subsequently, the negative effect on the economy grows
marginally from the 10th quarter onwards and stabilizes at a multiplier of approximately
-0.25. Accounting for the simultaneous changes to net tax levels through the calculation of
cumulative multipliers, we find very similar effects to the non-accumulated tax multipliers.
Nevertheless, with the exception of the initial impact multiplier, the negative effects on
GDP are not statistically significant through the time horizon.
Discussion of Baseline Results
Given the large presence of government spending and an extensive tax base in Norway, we
would expect to find a more significant influence from fiscal shocks. Nonetheless, studies of
economies more comparable to the Norwegian in size and openness find inconclusive effects
of fiscal policy (Perotti, 2005; Afonso and Sousa, 2009; Parkyn and Vehbi, 2014), which
could imply that fiscal shocks affect the economy differently in smaller, open economies.
Several characteristics of the Norwegian economy could drive these insignificant effects.
In particular, estimation of fiscal policy effects has shown to be sensitive to the state of
the economy, the level of openness and development, and the exchange rate regime within
an economy (Ramey, 2016). For instance, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) show that
fiscal multipliers are heavily influenced by the state of the economy, finding significantly
larger effects in recessions than expansions. The Norwegian economy has experienced a
relatively prolonged state of expansion since the Norwegian banking crisis in the late 80s
and early 90s, and was less affected by the Great Recession than many other countries
due to the stabilization policies previously discussed. Thus, it could be that the effects
of spending and tax multipliers have been smaller in Norway through the sample period.
Regarding the openness and exchange rate regime, standard and New-Keynesian theory
incorporating sticky prices predict that fiscal multipliers are smaller in open economies
than more closed ones (Hebous, 2011). This has further been empirically supported by
studies of small, open economies such as New Zealand (Parkyn and Vehbi, 2014), Croatia
(Grdović Gnip, 2014) and South Africa (Kemp, 2020), which commonly find smaller
multipliers for spending and tax shocks than larger economies. As Norway represents
a small, open economy with a floating exchange rate, there could arguably be smaller
effects to be found from domestic fiscal policy.
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Moreover, as shown by previous literature (Caldara and Kamps, 2008), the identification
of exogenous spending and tax shocks is sensitive to underlying mechanisms in the fiscal
framework, in addition to the characteristics and persistence of identified fiscal shocks.
Consequently, it may be that Norway is prone to inconclusive results on fiscal policy
effects due to a limited amount of identified fiscal shocks. For instance, several studies
in the U.S. find significant effects of spending shocks related to military build-ups in
the outbreak of war (Romer and Romer, 2010; Caldara and Kamps, 2008). In contrast,
Norway appears to have experienced few persistent shocks to government spending or net
tax levels of the same magnitude. Indeed, when reviewing the primary changes to the
Norwegian tax system throughout our sample period, we find that most reforms have
focused on the structure of taxation rather than the level of net taxes. Namely, large tax
reforms in 1992 and 2006 focused upon changes to marginal tax rates and broader tax
bases, such as changing the balance between capital and income tax rates and change rules
of tax deductions (Thoresen et al., 2010; NOU2003:9, 2003). Such tax system changes are
not necessarily captured in SVAR studies investigating spending and tax levels, which
implicitly assumes that fiscal policy affects the economy primarily through demand-side
channels (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002).
Thus, a plausible cause of our inconclusive findings could be a limited amount of identified
fiscal shocks in our data. This may partly be due to the characteristics of the Norwegian
government and the budgetary process. First, the process of fiscal decision-making in
Norway may cause limited exogenous fiscal shocks due to several factors. The annual
budget is proposed by the current administration, before being negotiated and determined
within the Norwegian Parliament. These budgetary proposals and ensuing negotiations
have been subject to lengthy discussions and few large changes seem to prevail. While
administrations have been subject to coalition governments, budget negotiations within
the Parliament are characterized by opposing debate and alternative proposals. This
could pose less room for manoeuvre for a particular government to implement large policy
changes. Moreover, an influential factor could be that opposing political parties in Norway
through the sample period have been rather similar and centrist in the discussion of large
fiscal policy structures. Although significant fiscal policy changes have occasionally been
promoted ahead of an election or shift in political power, most changes to budgetary
decisions seem to affect marginal tax rates and facilitate automatic stabilizers, rather
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than conduct large exogenous spending increases and tax cuts. Thus, there may be less of
a desire to conduct large fiscal changes from one government to the next than in other
countries, causing limited shocks to tax or spending levels.
Second, even if a government wanted to exert large changes, the majority of spending
and tax decisions in the annual national budget are predetermined components, following
well-established patterns that only change incrementally. Thus, there is a limited share of
spending or tax decisions for which large changes are likely to occur.
Third, the Sovereign Wealth Fund in the Norwegian Fiscal Framework could be a
contributing factor to the lack of large changes to spending and tax levels. Fiscal
policy in Norway aims for a limited budget deficit to be covered by an expected real return
of 3% of the Sovereign Wealth Fund. Although this allows for increasing spending levels
over time as the fund grows, this also implies that large spending changes are less expected,
as the fiscal rule somewhat limits the fiscal room for manoeuvre for each government.
Similarly, with the stable withdrawal of funds to cover budget deficits since 1992, there
has arguably been less of a need for sizeable tax changes. In consequence, these underlying
factors seem to induce a lack of substantial exogenous shocks to government spending
and net tax levels through our sample period.
Last, fiscal policy and the effects on the Norwegian economy could be subject to influence
from variables not included in this model, causing an omitted variable bias. For instance,
the inclusion of key indices of interest rate and price developments could aid the approach
in the isolation of truly exogenous fiscal shocks. As such, it could be an interesting exercise
to impose similar sign restrictions to a model adding other potentially influential variables.
To this end, we expand our baseline model to two separate five-variable VAR models to
conduct sensitivity analyses of our baseline findings.
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7.2 Sensitivity Analyses
Five-Variable VAR with Private Consumption and Private Investment
First, we expand the model to a five-variable VAR with two large components of GDP,
including private consumption and private investment. Following Equation 5.1 we can
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Similar to our baseline VAR model, we use four lags and a trend variable in our expanded
model. We also include additional restrictions as proposed in table 7.3.
Table 7.3: Imposed Sign Restrictions Including Private Consumption and Investment
GDP Spending Net Taxes Private Consumption Private Investment
Business Cycle Shock + + + +
Spending Shock +
Tax Shock +
Note: ’+’ indicates that the impulse responses are restricted to be positive after a shock. Similarly, ’-’ restrict the
responses to be negative. Lastly, blank fields indicate no restrictions
The inclusion of these components of GDP is interesting in itself, as the literature
predominantly limits the analysis to effects on aggregate output. Furthermore, where
the central theoretical frameworks generally converge on the effects on GDP, there is
no theoretical consensus on the effects on consumption and private investment following
spending and tax shocks. Related empirical literature investigating these effects offers
mixed support (Ramey, 2016). Consequently, in addition to assess the sensitivity of our
baseline results, the inclusion of these key components of Norwegian GDP provides a
valuable contribution to the discussion of fiscal policy in small, open economies.
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Figure 7.3: Impulse Response Functions following a spending shock. The solid line
describe the median impulse responses, while the broken lines represent confidence bands
at the 16% and 84% level. G: Government Spending, C: Private Consumption, I: Private
Investment, Y: GDP
Table 7.4: Multipliers for a Spending Shock
1st Quarter 4th Quarter 8th Quarter 12th Quarter 20th Quarter Peak
GDP 0.43 0.167 0.43 0.51 0.60 0.60 (20)
Consumption -0.10 -0.03 -0.04 0.06 0.15 0.15 (20)
Investment -0.08 -0.28 -0.13 -0.12 0.03 -0.28 (4)
We find a mild, negative effect of a spending shock on private consumption, where a
one-krone spending increase reduces consumption by 0.10 kroner on impact. Thus, our
findings are consistent with neoclassical assumptions, implying that government spending
crowds out private consumption due to a negative wealth effect on permanent income
(Friedman, 1957). Comparable, negative effects on consumption are found in studies of
economies such as Germany and Italy (Afonso and Sousa, 2009). However, the negative
multiplier is quite weak and nulled out within three years, after which the effects turns
positive and peaks at a multiplier of 0.15. In addition, these estimates are not statistically
significant throughout the time horizon. Therefore, conclusive inference of the effect on
private consumption is limited.
Furthermore, we find that an increase in government spending negatively affects private
investment. On impact, a one-krone spending increase reduces private investment by -0.08
kroner. This negative effect is persistent throughout the time horizon, reaching a trough
within a year at a multiplier of -0.28. This supports the Keynesian and New-Keynesian
predictions of a crowding out effect due to an interest rate hike following increased demand.
After four years, the effect is nulled out and mean reverts. Although empirical literature
offers mixed support for the effects on investment, our estimated impulse response function
is similar in form to those found by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Mountford and
Uhlig (2009) where the negative impact is largest within a year. This could suggest that
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the ensuing crowding out effect of the interest rate hike on private investment is largest
in the early aftermath of a spending shock. Subsequently, this negative effect on private
investment is gradually balanced out, which could imply that an offsetting accelerator
effect backed by increase aggregate demand manifests itself through the period. However,
in contrast to the large negative effects on investment found in some previous studies,
our estimated effect is smaller and not statistically significant. As such, any conclusive
inference from these estimates should be considered with caution. This is comparable to
findings in studies of smaller OECD economies (Perotti, 2005), which could imply that
the effects are generally less clear-cut in smaller, open economies than the U.S.
When adding private consumption and investment to the model, we find a more persistent
positive effect on GDP following a spending increase. Although the form of our impulse
response function is similar to our baseline results, we find a larger initial effect on output
where a one-krone spending increases raises GDP by 0.43 kroner on impact. Furthermore,
following a drop towards zero after the initial impact, this positive effect stabilizes at a
higher level and peaks at 0.60 after five years. This growth in positive effects through
the time horizon appear to be carried by the nulling out of an initial negative effect on
private consumption and investment. This suggests that an accelerator effect prevails
with a lag over this initial crowding out effect. Nonetheless, similar to our results in the
three-variable model, the positive effects on output are not statistically significant.
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Figure 7.4: Impulse Response Functions following a tax shock. The solid line describe
the median impulse responses, while the broken lines represent confidence bands at the 16%
and 84% level. G: Government Spending, C: Private Consumption, I: Private Investment,
Y: GDP
Table 7.5: Multipliers for a Tax Shock
1st Quarter 4th Quarter 8th Quarter 12th Quarter 20th Quarter Peak
GDP 0.65 1.04 1.18 1.03 0.49 1.18 (8)
Consumption 0.52 0.70 0.79* 0.69 0.35 0.79 (8)
Investment -0.23 0.70* 0.76* 0.70* 0.36 0.76* (8)
Concerning the effects of tax shocks on consumption, both conventional Keynesian and
modern DSGE models imply that tax increases cause negative multipliers on consumption.
In contrast, we find a positive effect of a tax increase on private consumption with an
impact multiplier of 0.52. This positive effect is persistent throughout the time horizon,
peaking at 0.79 after two years before gradually decreasing towards the trend. This is
counterintuitive, as most theoretical and empirical literature predicts negative effects
on private consumption (Ramey, 2016). However, as studies outside of the U.S. have
illustrated, the effects of taxes on private consumption are not entirely conclusive, and
crowding in effects on consumption are found in e.g. Australia and Germany (Perotti, 2005;
Afonso and Sousa, 2009). Moreover, in contrast to the estimated effects of government
spending, this counterintuitive effect is statistically significant for a prolonged period,
although estimates at longer horizons should be interpreted with caution.
Consistent with theoretical predictions and previous empirical findings, we find that tax
increases have an initial negative effect on private investment with an impact multiplier of
-0.30. However, this negative effect is short-lived and turns positive from the second quarter
onwards, similar to the positive effects on consumption. This positive tax multiplier on
investment peaks after two years at 0.76, before gradually decreasing throughout the
time horizon. This is unexpected, as estimates of tax effects on investment are primarily
negative, although several studies find statistically insignificant multipliers. Nevertheless,
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a crowding in effect on private investment following tax shocks is found across certain
sample periods in Germany and the U.K (Perotti, 2005).
Importantly, our estimated effects on total output are greatly different in the expanded
model, and this crowding in effect on both consumption and investment appears to
significantly drive up the effect on GDP. In contrast to our baseline analysis, a positive
tax shock causes GDP to increase with a relatively large impact multiplier of 0.65,
peaking in positive effect after two years at 1.18. Although such positive effects from
tax increases are counterintuitive following most theoretical and empirical literature,
some studies point to the Expansionary Fiscal Contraction hypothesis, described by e.g.
Giavazzi and Pagano (1990). The study finds that, due to the indirect effects on future
business cycle expectations, contractive fiscal policy has in fact stimulated growth in GDP
across several European countries. In particular, tax increases played an important role
in this expansive fiscal consolidation in small, open economies similar to Norway, namely
Ireland and Denmark. This could suggest that such crowding in effects on consumption
and investment are more likely to be found in smaller, open economies. As such, there
could be instances for the Norwegian economy throughout the same period of time in
which tax increases have had a crowding in effect on private consumption, driving up
effects on output. It must be noted, however, that the positive effects of tax increases
found on GDP are not statistically significant and any conclusive inference is limited.
Rather, this variation in qualitative and quantitative effects of tax effects in general may
suggest that the identification and estimation of effects from tax shocks proves difficult in
certain economies. As discussed, the major tax reforms in Norway have primarily aimed
at changes to marginal tax rates rather than net tax levels. These tax shocks are not
necessarily captured by such an analysis, which could be a factor towards the rather
inconclusive results in Norway and other economies alike.
Five-Variable VAR Controlling for Monetary Policy Shocks
Second, as fiscal policy often interacts with monetary policy in affecting the economy, we
want to control for monetary policy shocks with respect to the findings in our baseline
model. Concerning Norway, monetary policy has replaced some of the role of fiscal policy
in stabilization of the economy after the shift to an inflation targeting regime. Hence,
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monetary policy shocks may influence the effects of fiscal policy on GDP and it is useful
to conduct a sensitivity analysis where these shocks are controlled for. To this end, we
extend our baseline model to a five-variable VAR model by adding a Mainland GDP
deflator and a key interest rate measure (NIBOR), following the methodology of Perotti
(2005) and Caldara and Kamps (2008). As the NIBOR interest rate was only available
from 1979:Q1 onwards, we conduct the sensitivity analysis controlling for monetary policy
shocks from 1979:Q1 to 2017:Q4. This could yield a slight difference with respect to our
baseline model, but we consider the analysis reasonable as only four quarters are removed.
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Following Uhlig (2005) and Mountford and Uhlig (2009), a monetary policy shock is
identified by a persistent rise in interest rates and a corresponding fall in inflation through
four consecutive quarters. Thus, we impose the following sign restrictions in our five-
variable VAR:
Table 7.6: Imposed Sign Restrictions Including a Monetary Policy Shock
GDP Spending Net Taxes Interest Rate Inflation
Business Cycle Shock + +
Monetary Shock + -
Spending Shock +
Tax Shock +
Note: ’+’ indicates that the impulse responses are restricted to be positive after a shock.
Similarly, ’-’ restrict the responses to be negative. Lastly, blank fields indicate no restrictions.
When adding inflation and the interest rate to our baseline model, the impulse response
functions of GDP (illustrated in Figure 7.5) are similar in form to those found in our
baseline model. Thus, our findings are not particularly sensitive to the identification of
monetary policy shocks and inclusion of inflation and interest rates. This is consistent
with previous literature such as Caldara and Kamps (2008) and Asche and Kristjánsson
(2019).
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Figure 7.5: Impulse Response Functions following a spending shock (left) and a tax
shock (right). The solid lines describe the median impulse responses, while the broken
lines represent confidence bands at the 16% and 84% level. G: spending, T: net taxes, Y:
GDP.
Concerning spending shocks, the findings approximate those found in our three-variable
model, albeit with some quantitative differences as illustrated in Table 7.7 below. On
impact, the positive effect on GDP is somewhat larger, where a one-krone spending
shock increases GDP by 0.23 kroner. However, similar to our baseline results, this effect
is short-lived and turns negative. Moreover, this negative effect of spending shocks is
slightly more persistent when accounting for monetary policy shocks. Subsequently, the
positive median response grows throughout our time horizon, similar to the findings in
our three-variable model, peaking at 0.69 after five years.
The estimated effect of tax shocks on GDP is also similar when controlling for monetary
policy. The initial effect is still negative and statistically significant on impact, although
slightly smaller with an impact multiplier of -0.57. This could imply that monetary policy
shocks capture some of the effects previously found of tax shocks when including inflation
and interest rate in the model. This negative effect is also the trough of the tax multiplier,
after which the multiplier turns insignificant and temporarily positive. This further
reinforces our notion that conclusive inference of tax shocks in Norway is somewhat limited.
Table 7.7: Multipliers When Controlling for Monetary Policy Shock
1st Quarter 4th Quarter 8th Quarter 12th Quarter 20th Quarter Peak
GDP - Spending Shock 0.23 -0.20 -0.01 0.19 0.69 0.69 (20)
GDP - Tax Shock -0.57* 0.13 0.14 -0.11 -0.37 (1) -0.57* (1)
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Subsample Stability
Finally, we test for subsample stability in our baseline model before and after 2001, aiming
to test for sensitivity in relation to the implementation of the fiscal rule and inflation
targeting. To this end, we split the sample and conduct analyses of a sample ranging from
1978:Q1 to 2000:Q4 and from 2001:Q1 to 2017:Q4.
Figure 7.6: Impulse Response Functions of GDP following a spending shock (above) and
a tax shock (below). Figures to the left represent the early sample, while figures to the
right represent the late sample. The solid lines describe median impulse responses, while
the broken lines represent confidence bands at the 16% and 84% levels. G: Government
spending, T: Net taxes, Y: GDP
When splitting the data series and analyzing the subsamples, we find that the median
responses for spending shocks become smaller and more inconclusive. This is expected, as
the subsample split provides a limited amount of observations for the analysis of fiscal
shocks. Whereas the spending multiplier is approximating zero for the early sample
estimates, the counterintuitive negative effect on output from a positive spending shock is
larger for the late sample than in our baseline model. None of the samples display the
growing, positive effect found on output in the full sample. Nevertheless, the spending
multipliers estimated from the subsamples are not significant throughout the time horizon.
Concerning tax shocks, the impulse response function found in the early sample
approximates our baseline findings to a larger extent. After a significant, negative
effect on impact, the effect turns insignificant and ambiguous throughout the time horizon.
Conversely, when estimating tax effects in the late sample, the impact multiplier is virtually
zero before affecting GDP positively. This implies that the effects of tax increases may
have changed throughout the sample period, becoming procyclical since the changes in
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policy regimes. However, the diverging effects pre- and post 2001 may rather reinforce
the identified challenges of estimating conclusive tax multipliers for Norway.
The findings in our subsample stability analysis appear to be affected by the loss of several
degrees of freedom due to the much smaller sample size. An alternative approach to test for
subsample stability could be to implement Markov switching models that allows for time-
varying effects across the different states of the economy. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2012) used a regime-switching model to estimate fiscal multipliers dependent on the state
of the economy, finding larger effects in contractions than in expansions. However, these
models are computationally challenging to implement with the sign restrictions approach.
Hence, the analysis is beyond the scope and time limitations of this master thesis.
7.3 Comparison with Recursive Ordering Approach
To gain further insight regarding the implications of the sign restrictions approach in a
small, open economy, we investigate how the empirical estimates of our baseline, three-
variable model change when applying a conventional identification strategy. Since Sims
(1980), the recursive ordering approach employing a Cholesky decomposition has been
widely used to identify monetary and fiscal shocks, becoming the established standard
within SVAR models. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) build on this methodology when
applying SVAR analysis to fiscal policy, and most ensuing studies have employed exact or
modified versions of the approach. Consequently, we find it highly relevant to analyse fiscal
shocks through such an identification strategy to assess potential divergences resulting
from the sign restrictions approach. Furthermore, several studies argue that the recursive
approach and the Blanchard-Perotti approach are intrinsically prone to estimate virtually
identical results due to the underlying ordering of shocks to the variables Caldara and
Kamps (2008). As such, the analysis through recursive ordering identification facilitates a
solid comparative basis with the majority of previous literature.
Some studies argue that when employing the recursive approach, the choice to order
spending or tax shocks first could significantly affect the estimates. Nevertheless, we
follow Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and run the model with each respective shock ordered
first in order to test this. Similar to Blanchard and Perotti (2002), we find that this does
not significantly affect the impulse responses. Therefore, we follow the seminal study
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and order spending first, consistent with other literature employing recursive ordering
(Caldara and Kamps, 2008; Kemp, 2020).
Figure 7.7: Comparison of recursive ordering (black lines) and sign restrictions (red
lines) approaches following a spending shock. The solid lines describe median impulse
responses, while the broken lines represent confidence bands at the 16% and 84% levels.
Figure 7.7 describes a comparison of the dynamic effects on GDP following a spending
shock identified through the recursive and sign restrictions approach, respectively. When
identifying government spending shocks through the recursive ordering approach, our
findings are qualitatively similar to those with sign restrictions, with some key differences.
First, the estimated impact multiplier is substantially larger, implying that a positive
spending shock increases GDP by 0.42 kroner on impact. Furthermore, this positive
impact multiplier is statistically significant. As illustrated in figure 7.7, the impulse
response function mirrors that found through sign restrictions. Following a similar fall
in effect approximating zero, the impact multiplier grows positive throughout the time
horizon, stabilizing at a multiplier between 0.4 and 0.5 after two years.
Notably, the effects of a positive spending shock on GDP found through recursive ordering
is quantitatively very similar to those found by Asche and Kristjánsson (2019), with
almost identical multipliers on impact and after two to three years. This is expected,
given the similarities in the identification approach applied on both models. This indicates
that the sign restrictions approach is the predominant source of divergence with respect
to previous findings in Norway, resulting in a significantly lower median impulse response
which at times turn negative. Contrary to the findings when employing sign restrictions,
these positive effects on GDP are significant from the 8th quarter onwards. This difference
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in significance when comparing the approaches is expected: in contrast to the strong
assumptions imposed by the recursive ordering, a larger variation of results is expected to
fit the less rigid sign restrictions. This is further found in previous literature which find
wider confidence bands with sign restrictions than with recursive ordering (Caldara and
Kamps, 2008; Kemp, 2020).
Figure 7.8: Comparison of the Recursive Ordering (black lines) and Sign Restrictions
(red lines) approaches following a tax shock. The solid line describe the median impulse
responses, while the broken lines represent confidence bands at the 16% and 84% levels.
The effects on output following a tax shock when estimated through the recursive
approach are quite different. First, the estimated impact multiplier on output of a
positive tax shock is zero. This is due to the approach, as tax shocks are ordered last in
the recursive ordering of different shocks. This imposes a zero restriction on the response
of output to taxes in the current period, and as such implies a zero effect on impact from
tax shocks. In contrast to the negative impact multiplier found with sign restrictions, the
effect of a tax increase is now generally estimated to be positive throughout the time
horizon. Peaking after five quarters at a tax multiplier of 0.41, this positive effect is
persistent until it is nulled out after five years. As discussed, this is unexpected following
most theoretical and empirical literature, with the exception of the Expansionary Fiscal
Contraction hypothesis (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990) and some studies outside of the U.S.
(Afonso and Sousa, 2009). This positive effect on output is significant from the impact
multiplier until the seventh quarter, in contrast to our findings of tax effects through
sign restrictions. Thus, the recursive ordering approach induces quite different impulse
responses when identifying tax shocks. As discussed above, we find these counterintuitive
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effects on GDP in our sensitivity analysis when expanding our baseline model. Following
our previous discussion on tax shocks, this may rather underline the challenges with
estimating tax effects in a small, open economy such as Norway with a limited amount of
identified tax shocks.
Discussion of Identification Approach
In general, criticism of the conventional methods building on recursive ordering have
been based on two main limitations. First, the recursive ordering implicitly imposes
a chain of causation in the model and thus leads the results towards predetermined
assumptions. Second, the estimates are highly sensitive to these theoretical assumptions
and the calculation of parameters representing structural relationships. In contrast, the
sign restrictions approach aims to relieve the analysis of this predetermined chain of
causation and large sensitivity to theoretical assumptions as well as externally calculated
estimates. Economic relationships may be changing rapidly with frequent changes of
fiscal and monetary regimes and large business cycle fluctuations, illustrated by the Great
Recession, the Eurozone crisis and the recession induced by the COVID-19 pandemic. In
this regard, it is not necessarily reasonable to assume that the parameters representing
structural relationships of macroeconomic variables are constant over time. As such, the
major advantage of the sign restrictions approach is that it imposes weaker restrictions
based on less assumptions, aiming to stay agnostic with respect to contemporaneous
relationships. Being less sensitive to the calculation of structural parameters, the sign
restrictions approach could be more suited to identify shocks despite changing relationships.
Furthermore, the agnostic aim is more in line with the seminal work of Sims (1980), which
pioneered VAR models as a response to conventional, heavy models which some argue
rather confirmed their inherent assumptions than estimating true effects (Ramey, 2016).
Consequently, an agnostic approach is desirable in an attempt to “let the data speak for
itself”. This is additionally beneficial when working with high-dimensional VAR models
with a large amount of variables, as the sign restrictions utilizing Bayesian techniques
may to a larger degree overcome the curse of dimensionality when applying certain priors
(Koop and Korobilis, 2010). Nonetheless, employing the sign restrictions approach does
come at a cost.
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We find that the sign restrictions approach pose certain limitations, which predominantly
seem to stem from the less rigid restrictions, as previously discussed. The sign restrictions
approach induces substantially larger variation in the estimated effects, resulting in larger
confidence bands and less significant multipliers over the time horizons. This, in turn,
yields less credibility when extrapolating policy implications for Norway. Although we
find a significant, negative tax multiplier on impact when employing sign restrictions, the
significance is short-lived and the effects approximate zero. Concerning spending shocks,
the initial estimated effect is close to zero and the multipliers are not statistically significant.
As more significant effects of spending shocks are found through the recursive ordering
approach, this may suggest that identification through sign restrictions is challenging for
Norway. Thus, our findings support previous criticism of the sign restrictions approach
which argue that the strategy is likely to yield less conclusive results on the effects of
structural shocks (Fry and Pagan, 2011).
Furthermore, certain a priori economic assumptions will arguably enter the approach one
way or another; for instance, as discussed, we assume that tax changes affect the economy
through demand-side channels when analysing government revenue levels. Along these
lines, one could argue that the qualitative and quantitative assumptions learned from
centuries of economic research should indeed count for something. Evidently, we also
impose theoretical assumptions when restricting the direction of impulse responses. In this
regard, the results are sensitive to the imposed sign restrictions, the directions of which
are not necessarily agreed upon (Uhlig, 2017). Furthermore, as Paustian (2007) notes, one
needs to impose sufficient and appropriate restrictions to such analyses to identify any
structural shocks. Although our imposed sign restrictions are based on well-established
literature, the restrictions are relatively general and may struggle to distinguish between
the underlying relationships.
Last, implementation of the sign restrictions approach is computationally complex and has
proven to be highly time and resource consuming. The process has been rather challenging
given the scope and time limitations of a Master’s thesis, through which we have explored
several algorithms across multiple software programs. Thus, the computational capacity
and time required, in addition to the above limitations, somewhat counteracts the benefits.
In Appendix A1, we briefly present challenges related to implementing sign restrictions.
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8 Concluding Remarks
This thesis contributes to limited empirical literature concerning the effects of fiscal policy
in a small, open economy. The analysis employs the relatively novel sign restrictions
approach for identification of fiscal shocks in a Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR)
model of government spending, net taxes and Mainland GDP in Norway. Thus, we provide
insight into the effects of fiscal policy and study the suitability of the sign restrictions
approach for a small, open economy such as Norway.
We find a small and insignificant positive effect on output (GDP) from government
spending shocks. This is unexpected, as theoretical and empirical literature predicts
persistent, positive effects on total output. Although inconclusive effects are found in
studies of other small, open economies, we do find a significant, positive effect from
spending shocks when testing for differences with the more conventional recursive ordering
approach. This could suggest that the sign restrictions approach struggles to identify
substantial spending shocks in Norway.
On impact, we find a significant, negative effect on GDP following positive tax shocks.
This implies that a one-krone tax cut stimulates output by 0.78 kroner within the first
quarter, making the case for rapid effects of tax cuts in expansive fiscal policy. However,
the tax effect quickly decreases and is not statistically significant after the first quarter.
Consequently, similar to previous SVAR literature of Norwegian fiscal policy, we find
it hard to conclude on the effects of tax shocks. This notion is reinforced through our
sensitivity analysis and the recursive ordering approach, where we find counterintuitive,
positive effects on GDP from a tax increase. These inconclusive effects may be due to a
limited amount of identified shocks to tax revenue levels, as most tax reforms through our
sample period have focused on marginal tax rates.
When expanding the model to a five-variable VAR in our sensitivity analysis, we find
negative effects of spending shocks on private consumption and private investment.
Furthermore, we find counterintuitive, positive effects from tax increases on both
consumption and investment. However, the effects on components of GDP are generally
not statistically significant and any conclusive inference is limited. This further underlines
the notion that it is hard to conclude on the effects of tax shocks in our sample.
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Moreover, we find that the sign restrictions approach for identification provides valuable
benefits as well as clear limitations. Mainly, the criticism of conventional methods revolve
around the sensitivity of results to internally or externally calculated structural parameters
and imposing a clear chain of causation within the model. Conversely, the advantage of
the sign restrictions approach is that it imposes weaker restrictions and intends to stay
agnostic with respect to the contemporaneous relationships. In doing so, the approach aims
to relieve the analysis of a strict chain of causation and sensitivity to changes in structural
parameters. Thus, the approach could prove beneficial as structural relationships may
be changing frequently following macroeconomic fluctuations and changes to fiscal and
monetary regimes.
However, we find that the sign restrictions approach is prone to induce large confidence
bands and limited statistical significance in the estimated effects on output. This is an
expected consequence of the approach, as a large amount of possible impulse responses are
fitted to weak imposed restrictions in the model. As a certain amount of restrictions and
assumptions need to be imposed on SVAR models to identify shocks at all, it could be
that the approach struggles to identify a limited amount of shocks and estimate the effects
in a small, open economy such as Norway. Last, implementation of the sign restrictions
approach is computationally complex and has proven to be time and resource consuming.
Further Research
Previous studies have shown that the sign restrictions approach may prove more efficient
in larger, multi-variable models, for which we find several additions that could be beneficial
for further research. First, an interesting inclusion would be the price of petroleum as an
exogenous variable, as fiscal policy and business cycle fluctuations in Norway have been
sensitive to its development. Indeed, Bjørnland and Thorsrud (2019) finds a procyclical
relationship between the price of petroleum and expansive fiscal policy in Norway. Second,
given that tax reforms in Norway more likely cause changes to the structure of taxation
rather than tax revenue levels, a study of rates or indices emphasizing marginal tax changes
could be valuable. Third, several countries, including Norway, are facing fiscal policy
challenges in aging populations and the need for a structural shift from carbon-emitting
industries. Thus, there could be an urgent need for innovation stimuli and productivity
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growth in the economy, motivating an analysis of fiscal policy effects on productivity
measures following e.g. Afonso and Sousa (2009). Fourth, it could prove beneficial to
study effects of fiscal policy on developments in residential prices and the debt-to-income
ratio, which are economic relationships of current concern within monetary and fiscal
policy in Norway and other economies. Finally, although the imposed sign restrictions are
based upon a well-established theoretical and empirical foundation, it could be argued
that there are other reasonable sign restrictions or combinations of sign- and short-run
restrictions. The latter is, for instance, explored in studies of monetary policy (Robstad,
2018), and could be a valuable exploration for further research within fiscal policy.
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Appendix
A1 Computational Challenges with Sign Restrictions
The application of sign restrictions in a SVAR model is highly computationally challenging,
and the implementation of such an algorithm is beyond the scope and time limitations of
a Master’s Thesis in Economics. Thus, in order to employ the sign restrictions approach
in a SVAR study of fiscal shocks, we had to both find an effective code and an appropriate
software in which to apply it. The algorithm was required to be suitable to manipulate for
the Norwegian economy and the specific SVAR analysis with a three-variable model and
several shocks. In summary, the process of finding and developing a functional algorithm
to implement the sign restrictions approach has been highly time- and resource consuming.
The process led us through several algorithms across multiple unfamiliar software programs
and is described below.
1. GAUSS – Initially, we aimed to employ the original code of Mountford and Uhlig
(2009), which is publicly available. However, as the algorithm was written and employed
in the unfamiliar software GAUSS, we intended to replicate the code in STATA. This
implementation proved difficult, as the code lacked detailed commenting and contained
functions not available in STATA.
2. R – Moreover, we tested a sign restrictions-package provided in R, as implemented by
Danne (2015). Though the code worked fine and replicated the sign restrictions approach
of Uhlig (2005), originally applied on a monetary policy shock, it did not have the feature
of implementing several shocks simultaneously. As our analysis aims to study both Tax
Shocks and Spending Shocks in a simultaneous ordering, we found it difficult to use for
our purpose.
3. RATS – After further research, we found RATS as a potential software for utilization
of sign restrictions. A benefit to the program in RATS was available replication files of the
original code of Mountford and Uhlig (2009). Translating the replication code worked well,
but a difficult interface made tracking potential errors difficult. Importantly, we learned
that the algorithm also faced certain criticism in terms of proper draws from the posterior
distribution, which arguably made the impulse responses and confidence intervals biased.
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Last, as it focused on US data, it proved difficult to alter the code specifications and
adapt the code to our Norwegian data.
4. MATLAB – Finally, we tested the use of MATLAB and the recently published code
by Breitenlechner et al. (2019), who describe the package ZeroSignVAR. This package
takes into account the critique of Mountford and Uhlig (2009), and builds on the algorithm
of Arias et al. (2014). The flexibility in adding additional shocks, variables, and imposing
restrictions made it easier to adapt to our designated goal, and thus seemed to be the
best fit to our assignment.
A2 Data 63
A2 Data
A2.1 Additional Time Series
Figure A2.1: Real Values of Private Consumption, Investment, NIBOR rate and GDP
deflator with Fixed Prices (2018=100)
A2.2 Seasonally Adjusted Series
Figure A2.2: Seasonally Adjusted Tax Revenues and Depreciation with X12 Arima
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Mainland GDP: Seasonally adjusted with fixed 2018 prices. Quarterly data from
1978-2017. Retrieved from table: 09190 - National accounts Norway.
Net Taxes: Consists of Government revenue less social transfers, oil revenues, capital
income and other transfers. Seasonally adjusted and deflated with GDP deflator to obtain
fixed 2018 prices. Quarterly data from 1978-2017. Collected from Minstry of Finance.
Retrieved from KVARTS database.
Government Spending: Consists of Government consumption and gross government
investment less depreciation. Seasonally adjusted with fixed 2018 prices. Quarterly data
from 1978-2017. Retrieved from table: 09190 - National accounts Norway, with the
exception of depreciation which were collected from the ministry of finance.
Private Investment: Consists of consumption in households and ideal organisations.
Seasonally adjusted with fixed 2018 prices. Quarterly data from 1978-2017. Retrieved
from table: 09190 - National accounts Norway
Private Consumption: Consists of gross real investment of Mainland Norway less
government investment and residential investment. Seasonally adjusted with fixed 2018
prices. Quarterly data from 1978-2017. Retrieved from table: 09190 - National accounts
Norway
Interest Rate: 3 month Norwegian interbank rate (NIBOR). Quarterly percentage
data from 1979-2017. Retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis;
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/IR3TIB01NOM156N
GDP deflator: Constructed by current and fixed Mainland GDP prices. Quarterly data
from 1978-2017. Retrieved from table: 09190 - National accounts Norway.
Population: Retrieved from table 01222 - Population and changes during the quarter.
Quarterly data from 1997-2017. Retrieved annually before 1997. We used linearly
interpolation in MATLAB to obtain the missing quarterly data.
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A4.1 Spending Shock
Figure A4.1: Recursive Ordering - Three-Variable VAR - Spending Shock
Table A4.1: Multipliers for a Spending Shock
1st Quarter 4th Quarter 8th Quarter 12th Quarter 20th Quarter Peak
GDP 0.41* 0.06 0.32 0.43* 0.39* 0.43* (12)
Spending 1.00* 0.43* 0.36* 0.27* 0.18* 1.00*(1)
Tax 0.16* -0.04 0.11 0.22 0.25 0.26 (16)
Cumulative 0.41 0.33 0.55 0.71 1.03 1.03 (20)
A4.2 Tax Shock
Figure A4.2: Recursive Ordering - Three-Variable VAR - Tax Shock
Table A4.2: Multipliers for a Tax Shock
1st Quarter 4th Quarter 8th Quarter 12th Quarter 20th Quarter Peak
GDP 0.00 0.42* 0.38* 0.19 -0.04 0.49* (5)
Spending 0.00 0.04 -0.09 -0.11 -0.09 -0.11(8)
Tax 1.00* 0.87* 0.56* 0.31* 0.04* 1.00* (1)
Cumulative 0.00 0.39 0.49 0.52 0.50 0.52 (12)
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Table A5.1: Robustness - Multipliers for Different Model Specifications
1st Quarter 4th Quarter 8th Quarter 12th Quarter 20th Quarter Peak
Spending Shock
2lags 0.10 0.04 0.25 0.39 0.52* 0.52* (20)
6lags 0.10 -0.07 -0.17 0.38 0.65* 0.65* (20)
No Trend 0.07 -0.22 0.10 0.29 0.52* 0.52* (20)
GDP deflated Spending Variable 0.18 -0.18 -0.05 0.31 0.83* 0.83* (20)
Sub sample - Before 2001 -0.22 -0.23 -0.32 -0.32 -0.18 0.35 (9)
Sub sample - After 2001 -0.18 -0.74 -0.24 0.08 0.08 -0.74 (4)
Revenue Shock
2lags -0.79* -0.13 -0.10 -0.08 -0.10 -0.79* (1)
6lags -0.59* -0.14 0.20 0.35 -0.20* -0.59* (1)
No Trend -0.90* -0.31 -0.20 -0.25* -0.38 -0.90* (1)
GDP deflated Spending Variable -0.53* -0.23 -0.05* -0.08 -0.49 -0.53* (1)
Sub sample - Before 2001 -0.69* 0.02 -0.12 -0.18 -0.16 -0.69* (1)
Sub sample - After 2001 -0.13* 0.43 0.51* 0.13 -0.05 0.77* (2)
A6 Test Statistics 67
A6 Test Statistics
Table A6.1: Lag Selection Criteria - Baseline Model
Lag AIC HQIC SBIC
0 -10.38 -10.33 -10.26
1 -15.91 -15.78 -15.61
2 -16.21* -16.01* -15.73*
3 -16.18 -15.91 -15.52
4 -16.10 -15.76 -15.26
5 -16.04 -15.63 -15.02
6 -16.02 -15.53 -14.82
7 -15.98 -15.42 -14.59
8 -16.05 -15.41 -14.48
9 -16.07 -15.37 -14.33
10 -15.99 -15.21 -14.07
Table A6.2: ADF Test - GDP
Log Log-Difference
T-statistic Probability T-statistic Probability
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test -0.89 0.96 -5.89 0.00***
Test Critical Values 1% level -4.02 1% level -4.02
5% level -3.44 5% level -3.44
10% level -3.14 10% level -3.14
Table A6.3: ADF Test - Spending
Log Transform Log-Differenced Transform
T-statistic Probability T-statistic Probability
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test -2.20 0.49 -3.83 0.015**
Test Critical Values 1% level -4.02 1% level -4.02
5% level -3.44 5% level -3.44
10% level -3.14 10% level -3.14
Table A6.4: ADF Test - Tax
Log Transform Log-Differenced Transform
T-statistic Probability T-statistic Probability
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test -1.94 0.63 -4.262 0.0036***
Test Critical Values 1% level -4.02 1% level -4.02
5% level -3.44 5% level -3.44
10% level -3.14 10% level -3.14
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Table A6.5: Lagrange-Multiplier Test for Baseline Model
lag chi2 df Prob >chi2
1 9.2190 9 0.41731
2 7.1129 9 0.62537
3 13.4676 9 0.14256
4 11.1065 9 0.26848
H0: no autocorrelation at lag order
Figure A6.1: Eigenvalue Stability Condition - Baseline Model
All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle. VAR satisfies stability condition.
